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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Minimum Capital Requirements of Broker-Dealers
The basic function of a broker-dealer' is the execution of orders
for the purchase and sale of securities either for himself or his
customers. The activities2 of broker-dealers result in the accumula-
tion of a large aggregate of customers' property. Today more than
46 billion dollars in securities and one billion dollars in cash are
entrusted to broker-dealers by customers.3 Large customer cash
accounts result from dividends paid on shares held in street name,
proceeds of sales, and deposits in anticipation of future purchases.
Brokers hold shares as security until payment is made by customers
for their purchases. Shares listed in street name or customer name
are often left with a broker for trading convenience. Shares are
also held by the broker-dealer to secure the loans of margin cus-
tomers, to whom the broker-dealer has advanced a portion of the
purchase price.' In addition, the broker-dealer's business activities
go beyond that of trading; he may engage in underwritings, carry
inventories of stock in which he makes a market, or trade ex-
tensively for his own account, all accomplished largely by borrow-
ing from banks and other broker-dealers or by using funds of his
customers. With a large extent of borrowing by the broker-dealer,
I Sections 3(A) (4) and 3(A) (5) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 define the terms "broker" and "dealer" as follows: a broker is "any
person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others . . . ." 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1958); a
dealer is "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account . .. ." 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (5)
(1958). The term "broker-dealer" is used here to indicate a situation where
an individual (including sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corpora-
tions) combines the activities of both broker and dealer, or where there is
uncertainty as to whether a person is acting in one capacity or the other.
Furthermore, "broker-dealer" refers to one that affects purchases or sales
of securities that take place on the over-the-counter markets.
2 There are approximately 6,000 broker-dealers engaged in the over-the-
counter business in the United States. About 5,000 are registered with the
SEC, meaning that they use the mails and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce to effect transactions. The remainder do business that is ex-
clusively intrastate or exclusively in exempt securities such as federal gov-
ernment, state and municipal issues. The bulk of the over-the-counter busi-
ness is handled by the approximately 5,500 broker-dealers who are members
of the NASD. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 402-09 (3d ed. 1963).
8 Note, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 1290 (1964).
'Id. at 1292.
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coupled with the accumulation of customer's property, any insolvency
on the part of the broker-dealer and resulting inability to meet
loan calls and other financial obligations presents a serious danger
to the investing public. Thus, the financial responsibility of broker-
dealers is necessary to afford protection to the individual customer
and the investing public in general.
The financial responsibility of broker-dealers is subject to
regulation by one or all of three sources: ('1) the federal government,
(2) the self-regulatory bodies, i.e., the stock exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and (3) state
governments. We shall examine the tripartite imposition of net
capital requirements that take three forms: (1) net capital-to-in-
debtedness ratios, (2) minimum net capital requirements, and (3)
bonding requirements.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION
Federal regulation5 of the financial responsibility of broker-
dealers is accomplished mainly by rule 15c3-1,0 promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, section 8(b) 7 of the
Exchange Act, which establishes a net capital-to-indebtedness ratio
requirement for brokers-dealers who are members of national
securities exchanges or those broker-dealers who transact business
through members of such exchanges, also regulates broker-dealers
in this area. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate this provision
briefly before examining rule 15c3-1.
A. Section 8(b)
Section 8(b) makes it unlawful for any broker-dealer who is
a member of a national exchange or who transacts a business in
securities through the medium of an exchange member, directly or
indirectly,
to permit in the ordinary course of business as a broker, his
aggregate indebtedness to all other persons including customers'
credit balances (but excluding indebtedness secured by exempted
securities) to exceed such percentage of the net capital (exclusive
of fixed assets and the value of exchange membership) employed
in business, but not exceeding in any case 2,000 per centum, as
'A broker-dealer first entering the over-the-counter market is required
to register with the SEC as a condition to dealing across state lines. 78 Stat.
570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (Supp. 1964).
6 SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1964).
748 Stat. 888 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(b) (1958).
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the Commission may by rates and regulations prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.8
The section's obvious purpose is to safeguard customers against
the risk of a broker-dealer's insolvency by prohibiting him from
borrowing more than twenty times his net capital. But section 8(b)
is inapplicable to dealers who do no brokerage business, even though
they may hold customer's funds or securities, or to brokers who do
not transact business through the medium of an exchange member.
Even as to those broker-dealers covered by section 8(b), it applies
only to indebtedness incurred in the normal course of business as a
broker-dealer and not to any obligations outside of that business.
The SEC applied the 20:1 ratio of section 8(b) in a few early
cases'0 of broker-dealer insolvency. However, the section has never
been implemented by rule, and for approximately four decades, the
Commission has generally chosen to proceed against broker-dealers
under rule 15 c3-1 rather than under section 8(b)."
B. Rule 15c3-1
The rule was first announced in 1942 in the case of National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC,'2 where the Com-
mission stated that it had promulgated its own net capital-to-in-
debtedness ratio rule applicable to the entire over-the-counter
industry because it recognized a need for general rules to achieve
customer protection against financially unsafe broker-dealers. The
rule was adopted under section 15(c) (3) of the Exchange Act,
which prohibits any broker-dealer from using the mails or inter-
state facilities to effect any transaction in or to induce the purchase
of any security otherwise than on a national securities exchange
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors to provide safeguards with re-
spect to the financial responsibility of brokers and dealers. 13
8 Ibid.
'2 Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATiON 1350 (2d ed. 1961).
" E.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944) ; SEC v. Lawson, 24 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Md. 1938).
2 SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 407 n.377 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Special Study].
' National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 12 S.E.C. 322 (1942).1' 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1958).
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The rule itself, as adopted under section 15(c) (3), is simple
in statement: "No broker or dealer shall permit his aggregate
indebtedness to all other persons to exceed 2,000 per centum of his
net capital." 4
It should be emphasized from the outset that rule 15c3-1 is both
an entry requirement for the broker-dealer and a continuous, opera-
tional requirement that the broker-dealer must meet throughout
the course of business. However, it is not so much a qualification
device as it is a continuous, operational requirement. 5
The rule is vigorously enforced by the SEC and is one of the
most important weapons in the Commission's arsenal for assuring
the solvency of broker-dealers. By limiting the ratio of broker-
dealer's indebtedness to his capital, and thereby restricting the
amount which he may borrow, the rule operates to some extent to
assure confidence and safety to the investing public."0
C. Definition of Rule 15c3-1 and Explanation of Its Operation
Although the rule itself is simple in statement, it is complex in
its definition of the terms "net capital" and "aggregate indebted-
ness." The complexity has been justified, however, because the
rule, and its technical wording, is intended for particular application
to those with expertise in the specific business of executing orders for
the purchase and sale of securities.
The rule is imposed on all broker-dealers who are subject to the
broad jurisdictional language of the registration section' of the
Exchange Act, with two exceptions. First, those brokers who act
solely as agents for issuers in soliciting subscriptions to issuers'
securities, promptly transmitting the securities and proceeds, and
who hold or owe no customers' securities or funds are not covered
14 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (a) (1964).
' Special Study, pt. 1, at 86.
10 Blaise D'Antoni & Associates, Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th
Cir. 1961).
"' SECv. Fairfax Investment Corp., CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. 91432
(1964). Any objections to the accounting techniques required by the rule
on grounds that the procedures are not in accord with standard accounting
practices have been rejected thus: "Unless it can be shown that rule 15c3-1
is clearly an abuse of the Commission's rulemaking power, it is not in-
cumbent on the courts to look behind the rule and determine how it might
have been drafted more in accordance with concepts of good accounting. So
long as the accounting procedure is in conformity with the rule, it must be
deemed proper." SEC v. Graye, 156 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).1878 Stat. 570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (Supp. 1964).
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by the rule.19 Clearly, there is little possibility of large borrowing
by the broker-dealer in such a transaction and hence no immediate
fear of insolvency. Also, since the broker-dealer holds no customer
funds or securities, there is no danger to the customer. Second,
members of seven specified stock exchanges whose rules and settled
practices impose more comprehensive requirements than rule 15c3-1
are also exempted from coverage.
2 0
The rule defines "aggregate indebtedness" as the total money
liabilities of a broker-dealer arising in connection with any trans-
action he engages in, including such items as money borrowed,
money payable against securities loaned and securities "failed to
receive" that have not been sold by the broker-dealer, market value
of securities borrowed, and credit balances in any customers' ac-
counts that have "short positions" in securities. 2 It has been held
that a reasonable provision for accrued taxes must also be included
under "aggregate indebtedness."2 2 However, certain items are ex-
cluded from "aggregate indebtedness." They are:
(1) Indebtedness that is "adequately collateralized" by securi-
ties owned by the broker-dealer.2 8 An "adequately collateralized"
indebtedness is one that would be considered a fully secured loan
by banks in the community making comparable loans to broker-
dealers.2 For example, if banks generally were lending fifty per
cent of the value on collateral consisting of common stock, a 10,000
dollar indebtedness secured by at least 20,000 dollars of common
stocks would be "adequately collateralized." The term has the same
meaning throughout the rule.
(2) Indebtedness to other broker-dealers that is "adequately
collateralized" by securities owned by the broker-dealer.25
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b) (1) (1964).
"0SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b)(1) (1964), ex-
empting the American, Boston, Midwest, New York, Pacific Coast, Phila-
delphia-Baltimore-Washington, and Pittsburgh stock exchanges.
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1) (1964). For
a discussion of the borrowing and loaning of money and securities on the
part of a broker-dealer, "fails to receive," and "positioning" in securities,
see LEFFLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 409-10, 432-33.22 Cornelis de Vroedt, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5628 (1958).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (1) (A), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (1) (A)
(1964).
"SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (6) (1964).
'SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(1)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(B)
(1964).
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(3) Amounts that are payable against securities that have been
loaned if the securities are owned by the broker-dealer.2" This ex-
clusion operates to qualify the definition of "aggregate indebted-
ness," for, as seen above, the term includes money payable against
any securities loaned. The result is that only money payable against
securities loaned, but not owned by the broker-dealer, are included
in the computation of "aggregate indebtedness."
(4) Amounts that are payable against securities "failed to re-
ceive" that were purchased for the account of the broker-dealer and
have not been sold by him.2" This exclusion also operates to qualify
"aggregate indebtedness," leaving included in "aggregate indebted-
ness" money payable against securities "failed to receive" that have
not been sold by the broker-dealer but were not purchased for the
account of the broker-dealer.
(5) Indebtedness that is "adequately collateralized" by exempted
securities, i.e., federal government or state and municipal issues.28
(6) Fixed liabilities that are secured by real estate or any other
assets that are not included in the computation of "net capital"
under rule 15c3-1 29 -in other words, as we shall see under the defi-
nition of "net capital," any other asset that can not be readily
converted into cash.
(7) Liabilities on open "contractual commitments."8 0  The
term "contractual commitments" generally means firm commitment
underwritings that have been contracted for, but for which settle-
ment has not been made."' Thus, the firm obligation of a broker-
dealer, acting in the capacity of an underwriter, to purchase securi-
ties to be offered to the public would be an open "contractual com-
mitment" and excluded from "aggregate indebtedness." But the
exclusion is limited to firm commitment underwritings and is inap-
plicable to a best efforts underwriting, presumably on the theory that
with a firm commitment underwriting the exact number of securities
" SEC Rule 1563-1(c)(1)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(C)(1964).
"'SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(1)(D), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(D)(1964).
" SEC Rule 1563-1(c) (1) (E), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(E)
(1964).
" SEC Rule 1563-1(c) (1) (G), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(G)(1964).
0 SEC Rule 153-1(c) (1) (H), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (1) (H)
(1964).1 NASD Training Guide 100 (1963).
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to be purchased is known, whereas with a best efforts underwriting
the exact number is not known. 2 The reason why liabilities on
open "contractual commitments" are omitted from the computation
of "aggregate indebtedness" is that the securities purchased in the
underwriting are considered to be in inventory and hence are subject
to the net capital "haircut," explained below.33
(8) Indebtedness of the broker-dealer to one who has loaned
him cash or securities that is subordinated to the claims of general
creditors in accordance with a "satisfactory subordination agree-
ment.13 4 Since the indebtedness is made "junior" to the claims of
general creditors, it is not thought necessary to include it in "ag-
gregate indebtedness." Since the indebtedness that is subordinated
to such an agreement is also excluded from the computation of
"net capital," the effect is to treat the proceeds of such liabilities,
more properly denominated loans, as capital.35 However, the term
"satisfactory subordination agreement" is strictly defined under the
rule as a written agreement between the broker-dealer and the lender,
binding on the lender and his creditors, that (a) subordinates any
right of the lender to demand payment of cash or securities loaned
to the claims of general creditors of the broker-dealer, (b) is not
subject to cancellation at the will of either party for a term greater
than one year, and (c) provides that it will not be rescinded if the
effect of such recission would be to lower the net capital-to-indebted-
ness ratio below the prescribed limit of 20:1.30
An attempted summary of the above indicates that "aggregate
indebtedness" essentially means the money liabilities of a broker-
dealer that are not adequately collateralized by his own assets, are not
subordinated by a satisfactory subordination agreement, and are
not liabilities on an open contractual commitment.
"Net capital" is defined as the net worth (excess of assets over
" SEC v. Keith Richard Securities Corp., 148 F. Supp. 358, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). See also SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 186 F. Supp. 830, 859 (S.D.
Cal. 1960), where the court stated that "open contractual commitment" does
not include such items of indebtedness as customers' credit balances, even
though the broker-dealer impliedly asserted that it had a contract with a
customer with respect to the balances.
" The term "contractual commitments" also includes when issued, when
distributed, and delayed delivery contracts. SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (5), 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (5) (1964).
", SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (1) (I), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (1) (I) (1964).
" NASD Training Guide 100 (1963).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (7) (1964).
19651
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liabilities) of a broker-dealer, with certain adjustments that are
designed generally to reflect the current liquid position of the broker-
dealer." These adjustments are:
(1) The addition of unrealized profits and the deduction of un-
realized losses in securities held in the broker-dealer's accounts as
inventory or in trading accounts. 38 Broker-dealers will often carry
inventories in securities as part of the function of making markets
in the securities. Any unrealized profits or losses in the inventories
would result in an adjustment of "net capital." But the profits or
losses must necessarily relate to a broker-dealer's inventory in issued
securities and not to trading profits or losses in "when issued"
securities, for, if the shares are not in fact issued, the unrealized
profits or losses will be permanently unrealized."
(2) The deduction of all assets that cannot be readily converted
into cash.40 This would include such non-liquid assets as real estate,
furniture and fixtures, insurance, and good will. Where there is an
indebtedness secured by such an asset, the deduction made is the
excess of the value of the asset over the amount of the indebted-
ness." In some cases the Commission has softened this provision
by allowing non-marketable assets a value to the extent that a
broker-dealer can demonstrate that he has received a firm bid for
such assets or that they would be taken as collateral for a bank
loan.42 There is no fixed policy here; it is simply a discretionary
withholding by the SEC, in certain circumstances, of compliance
with the letter of the law.
(3) The deduction of specified percentages (colloquially called
a "haircut") of the market value of all securities, except exempted
securities, in long or short positions of the inventory or trading
accounts of a broker-dealer.43 The "haircut" percentages to be de-
ducted vary from zero per cent for the exempted securities to thirty
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (1964).
"6 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (A), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (A)
(1964).
" SEC v. Peerless-New York, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
'"SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(B)
(1964).
,
1 NASD Training Guide 104 (1963).
'
2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1354 n.257.
'
3 SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(C)(1964).
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per cent. In the case of undefaulted, non-convertible debt securi-
ties with a fixed interest rate and maturity date, the deduction is five.
per cent, unless the securities are selling at a discount of more than
five per cent, in which event the deduction is the amount of the dis-
count up to a maximum of thirty per cent.44 With cumulative,
non-convertible first preferred stock not in arrears as to dividends,
the deduction is twenty per cent.45 On all other securities, the de-
duction is thirty per cent.40  The effects of these deductions, in
addition to providing a margin of safety, is to provide a salutary
brake on the accumulation of securities by a broker-dealer and to
prevent him from over-extending himself. Thus, if a broker-dealer
invested 100,000 dollars from his capital in the purchase of stock for
his own account, it would be necessary to provide an additional
30,000 dollars of capital in order to remain in the same net capital
position as he had before the purchase. Similarly, if he contracted
to purchase 100,000 dollars worth of securities, he would have to
enter the full purchase price as a liability, but would value the stock
to be acquired at only 70,000 dollars, so that 30,000 dollars in cash
would be required to carry the commitment.4 Arguments have been
interposed by broker-dealers to the effect that whether or not they
are within compliance with rule 15c3-1 is not in their control, as a
market fluctuation may so vary the value of their securities that they
could be thrown out of compliance through no fault of their own.48
While this is the case, such an argument has been rejected by at
least one court as merely going to the wisdom of the rule.49
(4) The exclusion of liabilities subordinated under a "satis-
factory subordination agreement," the term having the same defi-
nition as it did under "aggregate indebtedness." 50 The result of
excluding such liabilities in computing both "aggregate indebted-
"SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (i)
(1964).
'4 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (C) (ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (ii)
(1964).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (C)(iii) (1964).
" Hearings Before the Subcommittee on SEC Legislation of Senate Com-
inittee on Banking & Currency on S. 1178-82, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 354
(1959).
" For an example of how such a situation might occur, see Special Study,
pt. 1, at 409 n.386.
," SEC v. Graye, 156 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (F), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (F)(1964).
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ness," as seen above, and "net capital" is to handle the proceeds
of such liabilities, cash and securities, as capital.
(5) For broker-dealers who are sole proprietors, the deduction
of the excess of liabilities not incurred in the securities business
over assets not used in the business.51
In summary, "net capital" means the liquid net assets of a
broker-dealer reduced by certain percentages of the market value
of most securities and excluding indebtedness subordinated by a
satisfactory subordination agreement.
D. Is Rule 15c3-1 Sufficient?
By the terms of the rule, aggregate indebtedness cannot be more
than twenty times greater than net capital. Thus, so long as a
broker-dealer maintains a minimal amount of indebtedness, he may
enter the market and continue to operate on a limited net capital.
For example, each 10,000 dollar increment of indebtedness requires
an increase of only 500 dollars in net capital to satisfy the rule.
Thus, it appears that the rule is of limited effectiveness in fulfilling
the purpose of assuring the financial responsibility and stability of
broker-dealers. While it may be of importance in helping to insure
the solvency of broker-dealers, it does not guarantee any minimum
capital commitment and does little to screen broker-dealers at the
crucial point of entry. The SEC has expressed its opinion of the
rule thus: "The ease with which almost anyone can start his own
securities firm has permitted many an amateur to embark on the deep
water of broker-dealer entrepreneurship." 5
The SEC has recommended in its Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets53 that broker-dealers be subjected to a "mini-
mum net capital requirement" as a requisite of entry into the
over-the-counter market and as an operational requirement there-
after.54 Such a requirement would be adopted, as was rule 15c3-1,
under section 15 (c) of the Exchange Act. The Special Study listed
several reasons why a minimum capital rule should be adopted.
First, securities laws depend heavily on the sanction of civil liability
81 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (G), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (G)
(1964).
12 Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1964, p. 6, col. 3.
Is SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinbefore and hereinafter cited as Spe-
cial Study].
5 Id., pt. 1, at 161.
[Vol, 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in favor of those who may be injured by violation of the laws by a
broker-dealer; if a broker-dealer has little or no capital, he may be
judgment proof, and hence the securities laws will not have the
effect intended. Second, no broker-dealer should be permitted to
carry on business on so thin a margin of capital that he must de-
pend on day-to-day transactions to continue business; nor should
he be permitted to rely on customers' funds and securities as a source
of working capital. Third, the "smooth and speedy handling of
securities transactions within the financial community itself require
that all members of that community have at least such minimum
of personnel and resources that they may reasonably rely on one
another's ability to do business responsibly."" Finally, a minimum
capital rule would insure that broker-dealers entering the securities
business have such a sense of commitment to their business as is
likely to produce responsible, reliable operations. 6 The minimum
net capital rule recommended was 5,000 dollars, plus 2,500 dollars
for each branch office and 500 dollars for each salesman employed at
any time.5 7 The nature of the recommendation suggests that the
Special Study recognizes that the requirement should not be uni-
form for all broker-dealers, but should reflect the type and size of
business engaged in.
Although the SEC has yet to follow the suggestion of the
Special Study, it is very likely to adopt a minimum net capital rule
in the near future. In the spring of 1964, the Commission infor-
mally circulated a proposed minimum net capital rule. It followed
the Special Study recommendation by proposing a minimum figure
of 5,000 dollars, plus 500 dollars for each salesman, but did not use
the number of branch offices as a standard of scaling up the mini-
mum. For broker-dealers dealing exclusively in mutual fund shares,
the requirement would have been 2,500 dollars minimum net capital
plus 250 dollars for each salesman. No action was taken, and the
rule has not been formally proposed, evidently because of sub-
stantial industry opposition. Later in 1964, the SEC again infor-
mally circulated a proposed minimum net capital rule. This pro-
posal would have required broker-dealers to maintain liquid reserves
equal to at least twenty-five per cent of the cash left with them by
customers. However, it too received criticism, and no formal action
5 Id. at 84.
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was taken. The Commission has announced that a new proposal is
being drafted."'
The industry's principal objections to a minimum net capital
rule are that it alone cannot assure financial or other responsibility
of a broker-dealer and that a broker-dealer can engage in overly
risky business practices, either in the selection of debtors or by way
of speculative ventures, even though he is required to maintain a
prescribed level of capital. Also, the objection is made that worthy
individuals without capital may be excluded from the business.5"
Nevertheless, it appears likely that a minimum capital rule will be
adopted by the SEC.
E. Relief for Violation of Rule 15c3-1
Basically, the forms of relief available to the Commission for
violation of its net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rule are injunctive
relief, revocation or suspension of the registration of the broker-
dealer with the SEC, and, if the broker-dealer is a member of a
registered national securities association, suspension or expulsion
from that association. Violations of the rule are detected by the Com-
mission under section 17 (a), where authority is given to make such
inspection of the books and records of a broker-dealer "as the Com-
mission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors."60
1. Injunction.--The issuance of an injunction under the Ex-
change Act is governed by section 21 (e), which conditions the right
to injunction upon sufficient proof that "any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will con-
stitute a violation" of the act or of any rule or regulation prescribed
under its authority.6 An injunction does not seek to put the broker-
dealer out of business or to harm him. It seeks only to restrain him
from doing business while he is in violation of the Commission's
rules.'2 The Commission is not entitled to an injunction against a
broker-dealer for violation of rule 15c3-1 unless it can make a clear
showing of a violation of the rule-a showing that the broker-dealer
"Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1964, p. 6, col. 3. See also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1964, p. 59, col. 5.
"' National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 12 S.E.C. 322, 325 (1942).
6048 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1958). See also SEC Rule
17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1964).6148 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958).
6" SEC v. Graye, 156 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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subjected his customers to risk by conducting its business with an
excess of indebtedness.13  Furthermore, where the violation is
the broker-dealer's first and the deficit is made good immediately
after the commencement of the SEC's action, an injunction will not
likely issue, because it is improbable that the violation will be
resumed. But where there have been repeated violations of the
rule in the past, an injunction will lie. 5
2. Revocation or Suspension of Registration with the SEC.-
Section 15 (b) (5) (D) of the Exchange Act provides that the Com-
mission, after notice and hearing, may revoke the registration of a
broker-dealer for a period not exceeding twelve months or suspend
him if it finds it is in the public interest and that such broker-dealer
has willfully violated any of the provisions of the act or any rule
or regulation thereunder. 6 This provision also authorizes the Com-
mission to censure a broker-dealer for violation of the act. Censure
can be an effective sanction against a broker-dealer, for it puts the
investing public on notice that he has willfully violated the securi-
ties laws. The Commission has held that where a broker-dealer
permits his aggregate indebtedness to exceed more than twenty
times his net capital, this, in and of itself, is a willful violation of
rule 15c3-1. 7 Substantially the same principles apply here as with
injunctions. If the violation is remedied as soon as it is called to
the broker-dealer's attention, there will be no suspension, revoca-
tion, or censure. But where the broker-dealer continuously violates
the rule and it is likely that he will continue to do so, suspension,
revocation, or censure will follow."8
3. Expulsion or Suspension from NASD.-Section 15A(1) (2)
(b) authorizes the Commission, after opportunity for notice and
hearing, to suspend for a maximum period of twelve months or to
expel from a national registered securities association any member
" SEC v. Robert A. Martin Associates, Inc., CCH FED. S-c. L. REP.
91178 (1962).
" SEC v. Casper Rogers & Co., 194 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; SEC
v. Reither, 146 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); SEC v. Norman Lemmons,
Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91040 (1961); Douglass & Co., 35 S.E.C.
586 (1954).
SEC v. Cohn, 216 F. Supp. 636 (D.N.J. 1963). Accord, SEC v.
Whitaker, CCH FED. SEc. L. RnP. 90998 (1960).
78 Stat. 571 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (D) (Supp. 1964).
'
7 Hammill & Co., 28 S.E.C. 634 (1948).
"Whitney & Co., 40 S.E.C. 1100 (1962); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C.. 436
(1958).
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thereof who has violated any provision of the Exchange Act or any
rule or regulation thereunder. As the NASD is the only national
securities association registered with the SEC, violation of rule
15c3-1 would result in the suspension or expulsion from that as-
sociation, assuming the broker-dealer was a member."0
6. Other Forms of Relief.-Section 32(a)7 1 of the Exchange
Act, which provides for fines up to 10,000 dollars or imprisonment
up to two years for violations of the act, is inapplicable to the net
capital-to-indebtedness ratio requirement, because section 32(c) 7 2
specifically exempts any violation of any rule prescribed pursuant
to section 15 (c) (3).
The general fraud provisions78 of federal securities regulation
would seem to give rise to civil liability on the part of a broker-
dealer if any refusal or failure to comply with rule 15c3-1 could be
interpreted as a manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent action. How-
ever, there appear to be no cases or rulings where a civil liability
was imposed on a broker-dealer for a violation of the rule under
the general fraud sections. Section 18(a)74 of the Exchange Act
would appear to be another possible source of civil liability on the
part of the broker-dealer for violation of the net capital-to-indebted-
ness ratio rule. It provides that any person who makes any state-
ment in a report or document that is required to be filed with the
SEC under the act and was false or misleading with respect to a
material fact will be liable to any person who, in reliance on the
statement, purchased or sold a security at a price that was affected
by such statement. Thus, if a broker-dealer filed a false or mis-
leading statement in the financial ledgers required by rule 17a-376
in an attempt to portray compliance with rule 15c3-1, when in fact
his aggregate indebtedness exceeded net capital by more than 2,000
per cent, and a person purchased or sold a security in reliance upon
such compliance, it would seem that such person could bring a
civil action against the broker-dealer under section 18(a). How-
" 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(1)(2)(b) (1958).
70 Heft, Kahn & Infante Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 76897 (1963).
'148 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1958).
7248 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1958).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c) (1), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(1) (1958); § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958);
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(A), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(A) (1958);
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
?4 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1958).
7' SEC Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1964).
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ever, there are no cases or rulings indicating that a civil action could
be brought under section 18(a) in such a situation. At any rate,
it would be difficult to show that a person bought or sold securities
in reliance on a statement in a financial ledger which indicated com-
pliance with rule 15c3-1.
II. REGULATION BY THE SELF-REGULATORY BODIES-
THE STOCK EXCHANGES AND NASD
A. The Stock Exchanges
The purpose of this section is to inquire into the net capital
requirements that are imposed on broker-dealers who are members
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the major regional
stock exchanges. Our concern will be primarily with the NYSE.
Any reference to broker-dealers here will be to those who have mem-
berships on one or more of the organized exchanges. Such broker-
dealers usually have specialized departments that engage in trading
on the over-the-counter market. The members of seven specified
stock exchanges-the American, Boston, Midwest, New York,
Pacific Coast, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, and Pittsburgh
-are exempted from rule 15c3-1 because their "rules and settled
practices are deemed by the Commission to impose requirements
more comprehensive than the requirements of this rule."
76
Generally, the net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rules of the
exchanges are the same in principle as rule 15c3-1. The primary
differences are three: (1) Many exchanges have a fixed minimum
net capital rule as well as a net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rule.
Members of such exchanges must meet either one or the other of
the rules, depending on whichever requires a greater net capital.
(2) The rules of some of the exchanges require a ratio of indebted-
ness to net capital lower than the 20:1 ratio prescribed by rule
15c3-1. (3) The rules of certain exchanges require greater "hair-
cuts" on certain types of securities and also give the exchanges
authority to demand larger "haircuts" on securities than prescribed
by the rules, if it is considered necessary and advisable.
1. The NYSE.-The NYSE imposes net capital requirements
on broker-dealer members by virtue of its rule 325, which prescribes
a net capital-to-indebtedness rule and demands a fixed minimum
net capital maintenance requirement. The net capital-to-indebtedness
"SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b) (2) (1964).
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ratio required is identical to the SEC's rule 15c3-1: "No member...
doing any business with.., members... or with the public. . ., shall
permit, in the ordinary course of business as a broker, his or its Ag-
gregate Indebtedness to exceed 2,000 per centum of his or its Net
Capital. ' 77 As to the minimum net capital requirement, rule 325 de-
mands that member broker-dealers carrying accounts for customers
maintain a fixed net capital of at least 50,000 dollars; those members
doing business with other members or member organizations, or do-
ing general business with the public but not carrying customers' ac-
counts, must maintain a net capital of at least 25,000 dollars. 78 The
rule further provides that initial net capital must be at least 120 per
cent of that required to be maintained at all times. Therefore, a
broker-dealer carrying customer accounts and thereby subject to the
50,000 dollar minimum capital requirement, would need 60,000 dol-
lars of minimum net capital on initially becoming a member of the
NYSE, the required amount dropping to a level 50,000 dollars after
admittance. Both the ratio rule and the minimum net capital rule ap-
ply with particular force to broker-dealers having transactions with
the public. However, rule 325 does not cover floor brokers, traders,
and specialists having no public business. The result of prescribing
both requirements is that the broker-dealer must meet either one or the
other of the rules, depending on whichever requires a greater net
capital. For example, assume that a broker-dealer carries no cus-
tomer accounts and that therefore the 25,000 dollars minimum net
capital requirement applies to him. If his aggregate indebtedness
exceeded 500,000 dollars, which would be more than twenty times
greater than 25,000 dollars, he would then fall under the net capital-
to-indebtedness ratio rule (requiring a 20:1 ratio between capital
and debt) and would be required to maintain a net capital of more
than 25,000 dollars to support that indebtedness and comply with the
ratio rule. But if aggregate indebtedness was less than 500,000
dollars, i.e., less than twenty times greater than 25,000 dollars, he
would be subject to the minimum net capital requirement and would
have to maintain a fixed level of 25,000 in minimum net capital.
2. NYSE's Definition of Net Capital and Aggregate Indebted-
ness.-Rule 325's definition of "aggregate indebtedness" and "net
capital" closely parallels that of rule 15c3-1. "Aggregate indebted-




ness" is defined under rule 325 as the total money liabilities of a
broker-dealer with specified exclusions such as liabilities adequately
collateralized, liabilities subordinated by a satisfactory subordina-
tion agreement to the claims of general creditors, liabilities on open
contractual commitments, and numerous other exclusions that
accord with the SEC's rule."9 "Net capital's" definition also con-
forms with that found under rule 15c3-1. It is defined under rule
325 as net worth less such items as fixed assets, prepaid rent, assets
not readily convertible into cash, and so on. 0 However, the defi-
nition does differ in one major respect in that it requires greater
"haircuts" than the SEC's rule. For example, it prescribes a thirty
per cent "haircut" on all securities in inventory positions instead of
the SEC's varying "haircuts" of five to thirty per cent.81 Also, per-
centage deductions from federal and state government securities are
required whereas no such deduction is imposed by rule 15c3-1. These
deductions decrease as the bonds approach maturity, ranging from
zero per cent with less than one year to maturity to ten per cent
with five years or more to maturity.8 2 Moreover, the amount of
"haircut" deduction on securities not held in inventory may depend
on the quality of the security. As an illustration, in the case of a
non-convertible bond, the percentage deduction may vary from five
per cent to fifteen per cent, depending on the rating given the bond
by a nationally known statistical service such as Standard and
Poor or Moody's. 8 3 The SEC's rule does not inquire into the
quality of the security.
It should be emphasized that the definition of "net capital" ap-
plies to both the net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rule and the mini-
mum net capital rule. Hence, when rule 325 speaks of requiring a
minimum net capital of 25,000 dollars or 50,000 dollars, this refers
to a level of net worth reduced by such items as "haircut" deductions.
3. Remedy for Violation of Rule 325.-The NYSE remedy for
violation of its ratio rule or minimum net capital requirement is to
suspend trading privileges.8" In light of the prestige and large
customer market this privilege brings, the remedy would appear to
' NYSE Rule 325(b) (2) (A)-(H), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.NYSE Rule 325(b) (4) (A)-(I), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
NYSE Rule 325(b) (4) (B), (C), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
82 NYSE Rule 325(c) (1) (A), (B), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
NYSE Rule 325(c) (4)-(6), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.8
,NYSE Const. art. XIV, §§ 6, 7, 2 NYSE Guide 9 1656, 1657.
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be most effective in thwarting violations of rule 325. However,
the argument can be made that this remedy may add to the diffi-
culties of a broker-dealer firm in a precarious liquidity position and
harm the customers by forcing an insolvency. The NYSE is able
to detect violations by surprise audits.85
4. Unannounced Policies of NYSE.-In addition to the above
two rules,
the NYSE has certain unpublished policies which have the effect
of rules. While the 20:1 rule is the formal requirement of the
exchange, on occasion, when a firm has come close to this level,
the exchange staff has recommended to the firm that in the future
it should maintain a ratio of aggregate indebtedness to net capital
of 17.5:1. Likewise, the exchange staff at times will bring to
bear pressure on its members to keep inventories of securities at a
value of not more than ten times excess net capital, i.e., the ex-
cess of the broker-dealer's net capital over the capital required to
support its aggregate indebtedness. 86
These policies appear to be specifically authorized by rule 325,
for it provides: "The Exchange may at any time ... in the case of
a particular member . . . prescribe greater requirements than those
prescribed herein."8 7
5. Fidelity Bond.-The NYSE recently instituted a require-
ment under rule 319 that all member broker-dealers doing business
with the public or other members carry fidelity bonds covering the
broker-dealers' general partners, officers, and employees.88 These
bonds indemnify member broker-dealers from losses resulting from
dishonest or careless acts of officers and employees, such as theft,
embezzlement, loss or misplacement of property, check forgery, or
fraudulent trading. Although the bond does not confer a right of
action directly on the customer who may be adversely affected by
such acts, it does serve indirectly as a protection to the public in-
vestor since the bond proceeds would add to the broker-dealer's
assets and might prevent or ameliorate bankruptcy." The required
minimum coverage of the bond varies with the type of business
done by the member broker-dealer and with the amount of net
capital he must have to support his aggregate indebtedness. For
"' See NYSE Rule 418, 2 NYSE Guide 2418.
" Special Study, pt. 1, at 408-09.
" NYSE Rule 325(a), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
" NYSE Rule 319, 2 NYSE Guide 2319.
"N ote, 77 HAgv. L. REv. 1290, 1293 (1964).
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example, for broker-dealers who do business with other members
of the exchange and do not carry customers accounts, the minimum
coverage required is 100,000 dollars. For broker-dealers who carry
customers' accounts and do business with the public, the minimum
coverage changes with the net capital required under the ratio rule,
ranging from a 200,000 dollar minimum coverage where the net
capital required is 50,000 dollars to 5 million dollars where the net
capital required is 12 million dollars.90
6. Central Indemnification Fund.-In 1964, the NYSE approved
amendments to its constitution that have the effect of providing
even greater safeguards for customers of member broker-dealer
firms. These amendments provide for a permanent central in-
demnification fund totaling 25 million dollars for repaying customers
of a member broker-dealer that becomes insolvent. 1 This pro-
tection was triggered by the collapse of Ira Haupt & Co. When Haupt
failed, the firm was holding for customers approximately 9 million
dollars in cash and 490 million dollars in securities. The Exchange
took the lead in liquidating Haupt, spending 9.5 million dollars of
its own funds to repay customers who had left securities with the
firm. It then levied on its members a special assessment. 2 The
amendments soon followed.
7. Other Exchanges.-Discussion here will be limited to those
major regional exchanges that have been exempted from rule 15c3-1
because their requirements are more comprehensive. The require-
ments of these exchanges are more comprehensive in several re-
spects. First, the net capital-to-aggregate indebtedness ratios are
stricter on some exchanges.93 Second, all of the exchanges ex-
empted from coverage by rule 15c3-1 have minimum net capital
maintenance requirements in addition to ratio rules. The American
Stock Exchange requires of member broker-dealers having public
customers a minimum net capital of 50,000 dollars, and of those
without public customers a net capital of 25,000 dollars; the Boston
Stock Exchange requires members to maintain a minimum net
capital of 25,000 dollars; the Midwest Stock Exchange requires
" NYSE Rule 319, 2 NYSE Guide 2319.
"NYSE Const. art. X, § 9, 2 NYSE Guide 1459.
"' Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1964, p. 6, col. 3.
" The maximum permissible ratios of the Midwest and Pittsburgh stock
exchanges are 15:1 rather than the SEC's 20:1 ratio. Special Study, pt. 1, at
408.
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corporate members to have a net capital of 25,000 dollars, whereas
individuals must have net capital of 10,000 dollars; the Pacific Coast
Stock Exchange requires its members doing business with the pub-
lic to maintain a minimum net capital in an amount at least 5,000
dollars in excess of five per cent of aggregate indebtedness, or not
less than 25,000 dollars, whichever is greater. Similar requirements
are in force on the other exchanges exempted from rule 15c3-1."A
Third, the "haircut" requirements of the exempted exchanges are
more comprehensive. A prime example of this is the "haircut" re-
quirements of the Midwest Stock Exchange, where government is-
sues, both federal and state, have a two and one half per cent "hair-
cut," whereas rule 15c3-1 requires no "haircut" on such securities.
Also, it prescribes a flat thirty per cent "haircut" on all securities
in inventory instead of the Commission's varying "haircuts" of five
to thirty per cent. Finally, the rules of this exchange provide that
"inactive securities" may be discounted in a greater amount than
thirty percent, i.e., if a broker-dealer keeps a class of securities in
his inventory for a substantial length of time, a higher "haircut"
will be required. 5 No comparable rule is found in federal broker-
dealer requirements.
B. National Association of Securities Dealers
1. Membership.-Membership in the NASD is not required by
the SEC, 6 although it has proposed that membership be made com-
pulsory for all broker-dealers engaged in an interstate over-the-
counter business. 9T Even though membership is not compulsory,
of the approximately 6,000 broker-dealer firms actively engaging
in the over-the-counter business only about 620 firms are not mem-
"Id. at 408.
"Halsted, Riles and Regulations of Midwest Stock Exchange, 1961 U.
ILL. L.F. 257, 258.
" In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act, which amended the Ex-
change Act of 1934 by expressly authorizing the voluntary formation by over-
the-counter broker-dealers of "national securities associations." Act of June
23, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958). A national securities
association may be registered with the SEC if it adopts rules for the regula-
tion of its members that conform to certain requirements, such as demon-
strating to the SEC that "such association will be able to comply with the
provisions of this title [the Exchange Act]. . . ." 78 Stat. 574 (1964), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1) (Supp. 1964). The NASD is the only association
registered with the SEC, and since 1939, it has been the major self-regula-
tory arm of the over-the-counter business.
"' Special Study, pt. 1, at 159. The proposal was rejected by Congress
when it enacted the 1964 amendments without such a requirement.
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bers of the NASD; the bulk of the nonmembers are broker-dealers
engaged in issues not considered to be securities, such as oil royalties
and savings and loan shares."
2. Pre-1964 Amendments.-Before the 1964 amendments to
the Exchange Act, the fundamental philosophy of the act was one of
free entry by broker-dealers into the over-the-counter business. This
philosophy was evident in the lenient requirements for membership
in the NASD, which in effect allowed membership in the association
if broker-dealers conducted an honest and responsible business.9 9
Accordingly, although the NASD enforced the SEC's rule 15c3-1, it
did not have any minimum capital or bonding requirements on which
it could have based a refusal to grant membership.' ° Previous at-
tempts by the NASD to impose such requirements had been opposed
by the SEC as inconsistent with congressional intent that NASD
membership be open to anyone conducting an honest and responsible
business. The SEC felt that such a rule would result in the ex-
pulsion of over one-fourth of the association's membership and
restrict it to the larger broker-dealer concerns.1 1
3. The 1964 Amendments.-The 1964 amendments to the Ex-
change Act abandoned this philosophy of free-entry, because of con-
gressional belief that it made entry too easy for the inexperienced
and unqualified broker-dealer.' °2 The result is that Congress has
now provided the NASD with broad authority to impose stricter
requirements for membership. Section 15A(b) (5) authorizes and
requires the NASD to prescribe rules barring from membership any
broker-dealer that does not meet "specified and appropriate" require-
ments with respect to the financial responsibility of such member. 0 3
It provides that a national securities association will not be registered
with the SEC unless it appears to the Commission that "the rules of
the association provide.., no person shall become a member ... un-
less such person is qualified to become a member in conformity with
specified and appropriate standards with respect to... the financial
responsibility of such member."' 0' This new authority will in all
8 LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 405 (3d ed. 1963).
" SORG PRINTING Co., SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1964 WITH Ex-
PLANATION 31 (1964).
100 Special Study, pt. 1, at 86.
... National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 12 S.E.C. 322, 325 (1942).
102 SORG PRINTING Co., op. cit. supra note 99, at 31.
10078 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(5) (Supp. 1964).
10478 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (5) (Supp. 1964).
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probability result in the adoption of a minimum net capital require-
ment for broker-dealers as a condition of membership in the NASD.
The amount of such a requirement is difficult to forecast. However,
in view of the new provision that NASD rules may classify pro-
spective members by taking into account their type of business,'"
it appears unlikely that there will be a uniform minimum capital
requirement for all NASD members. Account will probably be
made for size of the broker-dealer, number of employees, or the
type of business the broker-dealer engages in. Any indication of
what the exact dollar amounts will be can only be had from the
Special Study recommendations. 0 6
4. Disciplinary Powers.-The Exchange Act provides that an
association cannot be registered as a national securities association
unless "the rules of the association provide that its members . . .
shall be appropriately disciplined, by expulsion, suspension, fine,
censure,... or any other fitting penalty, for violation of its rules." 107
The NASD has established such power.' ° Thus, if the NASD
does adopt a minimum net capital rule, it will have effective sanc-
tions against a member broker-dealer for violation of such a rule
as it does now for members who violate rule 153-1.
5. "Mirror" Provision.-As noted above, Congress rejected the
SEC's proposal that all broker-dealers engaged in interstate over-
the-counter business be required to join the NASD. However, by
the enactment of a new section, 15(b) (8),109 Congress has pro-
vided for regulation of broker-dealers who refuse to join the NASD.
This regulation is comparable to that which the NASD is authorized
and required to adopt under section 15A(b) (5) for its members.
The new law provides that, even though a registered broker-dealer
is not a member of the NASD, he may not engage in the over-the-
counter business unless he meets standards relating to training, ex-
perience, and other necessary and desirable qualifications as the
SEC may prescribe. The point to be noted here is that, while the
SEC has been given power to provide standards and rules for broker-
dealers who are not members of the NASD that largely "mirror"
10578 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (5) (A) (Supp. 1964).
10 See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
10778 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (9) (Supp. 1964).
10'NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. VII, § 3(c), NASD Manual at
C-40 (1962).
109 78 Stat. 570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (Supp. 1964).
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those given to the association, the new provision makes no mention
of standards of financial responsibility for nonmember broker-
dealers. As seen above, however, the NASD has been given express
authority to establish standards of financial responsibility for mem-
ber broker-dealers. The reason for this difference is that Congress
felt that, in view of the authority already established in the SEC
under section 15(c) (3) to provide safeguards with respect to
financial responsibility, "it was unnecessary to mention this power
again in connection with the new power of the SEC to provide other
qualification standards for nonmembers.""'
III. REGULATION BY THE STATES
At present there are thirty-four states that have enacted blue-
sky provisions to assure the financial responsibility and stability
of broker-dealers. These states impose upon broker-dealers within
their jurisdiction either net capital-to-indebtedness ratio require-
ments, minimum net capital rules, and/or bonding requirements,
all of which apply both as conditions to entry and as continuous
operational requirements after entry. Although the blue-sky pro-
visions vary significantly from state to state, six patterns can be
derived:
(1) Those states imposing bonding requirements solely. There
are fifteen states in this class. They are (with the dollar amount of
the bond required) : Alaska (up to 10,000 dollars),"' Arizona (up
to 25,000 dollars), 2 California (5,000 dollars)," 3 Florida (5,000
dollars)," 4 Hawaii (5,000 dollars)," 5 Indiana (25,000 dollars), 6
Iowa (5,000 dollars) ,' 7 Maine (10,000 dollars),"' Michigan (up
to '100,000 dollars),"" Missouri (5,000 dollars) ,120 Nebraska (dis-
cretionary), 1- North Dakota (discretionary),122 Oregon (10,000
... SORG PRINTING Co., op. cit. supra note 99, at 38.
"'ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 45.55.040 (1962). See also BLUE SKY
L. REP. 6046.
""' ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943 (1956).
.. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25703.
2' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.12(4) (1962).
I" HAWAII REV. STAT. § 199-11(c) (Supp. 1960).
... IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-839(2) (1960).
1 IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.18 (1949).
11 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 229 (Supp. 1963).
1 1 9MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19,762 (1964).12o Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 409.140 (1952).
... NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 81.321 (1958).
""N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-10 (Supp. 1963).
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dollars), 23 South Dakota (5,000 to 15,000 dollars), 24 and Ver-
mont (1,000 to 25,000 dollars). 2 5
(2) Those states imposing minimum net capital requirements
solely. There are three states in this class. They are (with the re-
spective amounts required): New Hampshire (25,000 dollars),12
New York (10,000 dollars),127 and Pennsylvania (25,000 dollars) .128
(3) Those states imposing minimum net capital and bonding
requirements. This class includes seven states: Arkansas (minimum
net capital of 12,500 dollars and bond of 5,000 and up to 50,000
dollars),129 Colorado (minimum net capital of 10,000 dollars and
bond up to 10,000 dollars), 30 Georgia (minimum net capital of
100,000 dollars and bond of 10,000 dollars),' Kentucky (minimum
net capital of 10,000 dollars and bond up to 10,000 dollars), "'
Oklahoma (minimum net capital of 10,000 dollars and bond of
10,000 dollars),"' South Carolina (minimum net capital up to
10,000 dollars and bond of 10,000 dollars), 134 and Utah (minimum
net capital discretionary and bond of 10,000 dollars).'
(4) Those states imposing minimum net capital or bonding
requirements. These states require a bond only if net capital is
below a prescribed amount. This class includes four states: Ala-
bama (minimum net capital of 25,000 dollars or bond up to 10,000
dollars), 136 Minnesota (minimum net capital of 15,000 dollars or
bond of '15,000 dollars),' 3 7 New Jersey (minimum net capital of
12. ORE. REv. STAT. § 59.310(7) (1963).
124 S.D. CODE § 55.1912 (1960).
... VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4216 (1958).
.. N.H. Reg. 2, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 32610, promulgated under N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 421 (1955).
'
21N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-K.
... Pa. Reg. 1501, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP 41302, promulgated under PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 57 (Supp. 1964).
"'2 1 BLUE SKY L. REp. 1704.
'"
2CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 125-10-4(4), (5) (Supp. 1961).
... Ga. Reg. 2(d) (2), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 14303, promulgated under
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 97, § 105(f) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
2KY. REv. STAT. §§ 292.300(3)(b), (c) (1962).
.. Okla. Rules 59-1 and 64-14, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 39605, 39639,
promulgated under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 202(d), (e) (Cum. Supp.
1964).
1.. S.C. CODE §§ 62-110, 111 (1962).
...UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-4(4), (5) (Supp. 1963).
... ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 29(c) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
." Minn. Reg. VIII, 2 BLUE SKY L. RE,. 26608, promulgated under
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.12(2) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
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25,000 dollars or bond of 25,000 dollars),"" Ohio (minimum net
capital of 10,000 dollars or bond discretionary),' 9 and Virginia
(minimum net capital of 25,000 dollars or bond of 25,000 dol-
lars) .140
(5) States imposing bonding and net capital-to-indebtedness
ratio requirements. There is only one state in this class: Mississippi
(ratio requirement of 20:1 and bond of 5,000 dollars).141
(6) Those states imposing net capital-to-indebtedness ratio re-
quirements, minimum capital requirements, and bonding require-
ments. This class includes three states: Kansas (minimum net
capital of 10,000 dollars, ratio requirement of 20:1, and bond of
5,000 dollars),142 Maryland (minimum net capital of 15,000 dol-
lars, ratio requirement of 20:1, and bond up to 10,000 dollars) ,143
and New Mexico (minimum net capital of 5,000 dollars, ratio re-
quirement of 20:1, and bond up to 100,000 dollars) .144
A. Bonding Requirements
The bonds required by any of the above states, either as the
sole requirement or in conjunction with a net capital-to-indebted-
ness ratio requirement or a minimum net capital requirement, are
surety bonds and typically permit an aggrieved person to sue directly
on the bond for violation by the bonded broker-dealer of civil lia-
bilities provisions of the applicable blue-sky law. In fact, the bonds are
conditioned on strict compliance with the blue-sky laws.145 The bonds
are required before the broker-dealer can register and thus conduct
his business within the state, and usually run to the state for the
benefit of aggrieved persons. The sureties required on the bond
must be approved by the state. 4
It should be noted that these bonds differ from the fidelity
bonds required by rule 319 of the NYSE in that the fidelity bond
188 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-1-(e) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
1' Ohio Reg. DS-4, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP 38664, promulgated under
OHIO CODE ANN. § 1707.20 (1964).
... VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-505(b) (1964).
14 Miss. Rule D-5, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 27651, promulgated under Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 5373, 5368 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
" Kan. Regs. 81-17-1, D, 3A and 3B, 1 BLUE SxY L. REp 19703,
promulgated under KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 88 17 -1254(c), 1270(f) (1961).
... MD. CODE ANN. art. 32A, §§ 16(d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 1964)'.
1,, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-18-20.2, 20.3 (Supp. 1963).
E.g., ARIZ. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943 (1956).
E.g., CAL. CORP. CODy § 25703.
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does not confer a right of action directly on the customer, 47
whereas the surety bonds required by state blue-sky laws do. How-
ever, there is a limitation on this right, as most blue-sky laws de-
mand that the action be brought within two years from the time the
act complained of occurred.148
All of the states requiring bonds provide that deposits of cash
or securities will be accepted in lieu of such bonds.1 40 Also, most
of the states that require bonds do so regardless of a broker-dealer's
net capital. 50 But a few states demand a bond only in the event
that a broker-dealer's net capital, as defined in the statute or by
appropriate regulation, is less than a given amount. 1 Furthermore,
the bonds required are usually for a determined amount; but a few
states leave the amount of the bond to the discretion of their com-
missioner of securities laws, who is to base his decision on such
factors as the financial condition of the broker-dealer 5 2 or the
volume of business and number of salesmen employed.' However,
even though the bond required may be for a determined amount,
the amount may vary within a prescribed range, depending on the
number of salesmen a broker-dealer has.' 5
4
Clearly, the surety bonds required by a majority of the states
assure the financial responsibility of the broker-dealer at least to the
extent of the face value of the bond, because they allow only broker-
dealers with a substantial amount of money to pay for the bonds
(and who are able to get sureties) to enter into the business.
Furthermore, they prevent a broker-dealer from being judgment
proof when suit is brought for any violation of the civil liabilities
sections of the respective blue-sky laws.
B. Minimum Net Capital Requirements
The minimum net capital requirements, which are imposed either
as the sole requirement or in conjunction with a net capital-to-
indebtedness ratio requirement or a bonding requirement, appear in
varying forms with respect to the dollar amounts required. A
"' See NYSE Rule 319, 2 NYSE Guide 2319.
... E.g., COLo. REv. STAT. § 125-10-4(4) (Supp. 1961).
2' E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.14 (1962).
°E.g, S.C. CODE § 62-111 (1962).
... E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 29(c) (Cum. Supp. 1963).1' E.g, S.D. CoDE § 55.1912 (1960).
1 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-10 (Supp. 1963).
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1704.
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majority of the blue-sky laws prescribe 10,000 dollars or 15,000
dollars as the necessary level of minimum net capital. Georgia re-
quires the highest level of minimum net capital-100,000 dollars.' 5
A few states provide for more than one level of minimum net
capital. 1'5
Most states fail to define the term "minimum net capital" ("mini-
mum capital" in the words of several blue-sky laws), thus creating the
presumption that minimum net capital simply means a level of cash
that is required to be maintained by the broker-dealer. However, a
few states have defined the phrase either by using their own ter-
minology 17 or by using the same terms that define "net capital"
under the SEC's rule 15c3-1. 55 The few states that define minimum
net capital do so by regulations or rules rather than by the enabling
statute itself. Such a method is essential in light of the technical
nature of minimum net capital rules.
C. Net Capital-to-Indebtedness Ratio Requirement
The four states' 59 imposing a net capital-to-indebtedness ratio
requirement in conjunction with minimum net capital and/or bond-
ing provisions all prescribe a 20:1 ratio. The terms "net capital"
and "aggregate indebtedness" are defined in the statutes of the
respective states by using the terminology of rule 15c3-1.
D. Relief for Violation of Blue-Sky Provisions
The forms of relief available for violation of the above pro-
visions are fairly uniform throughout the states and roughly parallel
those found under the Exchange Act of 1934. First is suspension
or revocation of registration;100 second is injunctive relief."' Fine
and/or imprisonment is a third possible form of relief, one not
"I Ga. Reg. 2(d) (2), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP 14303, promulgated under
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 97, § 105(f) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
... For example, in New Mexico a broker-dealer must have a minimum of
10,000 dollars upon registration, but once registered, only 5,000 dollars.
N.M. Order 61-421B, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 34613, promulgated under N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20.2 (Supp. 1963).
"* E.g., N.M. Order 61-421G, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 34613, promulgated
under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20.2 (Supp. 1963).
' E.g., Okla. Rule 64-14, 2 BLUE SxY L. REP. 39639, promulgated
under OXLA. STA.T. ANN. tit. 17, § 202(d) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
"' Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, and New Mexico. See notes 141-44
supra and accompanying text.
.. 'E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
... E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.470 (1962).
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available under federal securities law.'1 2 However, the majority of
the states require that the broker-dealer had knowledge of the pro-
vision or rule before there can be any fine or imprisonment for its
violation.' 63
Most blue-sky laws provide for periodic examinations of broker-
dealers' records and financial statements. 6 4 Thus, violations can be
readily detected.
E. An SEC Ruling
In 1963, the SEC advised broker-dealers in New York that a
violation of a New York statute that specified a minimum net
capital requirement would be considered a violation of the anti-
fraud provisions. 5 The ruling goes beyond the scope of state regu-
lation because the majority of states do not provide for civil liability
for violating capital requirements. Thus, a result unintended by the
states may result from the operation of their laws. Whether the
ruling will be enforced is unknown, but it will undoubtedly serve
as a warning to those in the business.
F. North Carolina
North Carolina does not specifically provide for bonding, mini-
mum capital, or net capital-to-indebtedness ratio requirements.
The only provision expressly dealing with the financial responsibility
of broker-dealers provides that the Secretary of State may cancel the
registration of a broker-dealer if the broker-dealer is insolvent or
in danger of insolvency.'66 However, it requires registration with
the SEC as a prerequisite for registration in the state. This require-
ment subjects broker-dealers in North Carolina to rule 15c3-1 and
thus assures financial responsibility of broker-dealers, at least by
present federal standards.
G. Uniform Securities Act
The Uniform Securities Act contains two provisions directed
toward the financial responsibility of broker-dealers. The first is
section 202(d), which provides: "The [Administrator] may by
rule require a minimum capital for registered broker-dealers"16
7
16248 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1958).
E.g., MD. CoDn ANN. art. 32A, § 33(a) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
264E.g., S.C. CoDE § 62-120 (1962).
1"a CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 76927 (1963).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-19 (1965).
21 7 UNIqFoRpM SEcurrlEs AcT § 202(d).
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No net capital to aggregate indebtedness ratio is provided for.
However, the Official Comment to section 202(d) states that any
state that adopts the act and wants to prescribe such a ratio may do
so by adding at the end of section 202(d) : "or prescribe a ratio
between net capital and aggregate indebtedness." 168 Any definition
of the terms "minimum capital" or "ratio between net capital and
aggregate indebtedness" is left to section 412(a), which provides:
"The [Administrator] may from time to time make ... such rules
* . . as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this act ....
Such a relegation of the definition of these terms to administrative
rules or regulations is essential in view of their technical nature.
The second provision, section 202(e), relates to the posting of
surety bonds by broker-dealers:
The [Administrator] may by rule require registered broker-
dealers, to post surety bonds in amounts up to 10,000 dollars, and
may determine their conditions. Any appropriate deposit of cash
or securities shall be accepted in lieu of any bond so required.
No bond may be required of any registrant whose net capital,
which may be defined by rule, exceeds 25,000 dollars. Every
bond shall provide for suit thereon by any person who has a cause
of action under section 410 [section dealing with civil liabilities
under the act], and if the [Administrator] by rule or order re-
quires, by any person who has a cause of action not arising under
this act. Every bond shall provide that no suit may be maintained
to enforce any liability on the bond unless brought within two
years after ... the act upon which it is based.
170
The Official Comment to section 202 (e) states that the administrator
has no discretion whether to accept a deposit of cash or securities
in lieu of a bond but that he has discretion to ascertain if the
amount of the deposit and the type of securities deposited are
proper. '71 Many of the previously discussed blue-sky provisions re-
lating to the requirements of posting bond are similar to section
202(e).
IV. CONCLUSION
Among 215 new broker-dealers registering with the SEC in a
six month period in 1956, twenty-seven per cent had net capital of
"' Loss & Cow'r, BLUE Slx- LAw 265 (1958).
""UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 412(a).
17o UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 202(e).
171 Loss & Cowmr, op. cit. supra note 168, at 266.
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less than 1,000 dollars. 172 Hence, the present pattern of federal
regulation of the financial responsibility of broker-dealers is inade-
quate. More than a net capital-to-aggregate indebtedness ratio is
needed; a minimum net capital rule should be adopted. As recently
as November 22, 1964, the SEC announced that such a rule is to
be formally proposed within a short time. 17  Therefore, barring suc-
cessful opposition to its adoption, a minimum net capital require-
ment will soon exist, and adequate protection of the investing public
will be further assured.
With the adoption of a minimum net capital rule by the NASD,
the regulation of the financial responsibility of broker-dealers by
the self-regulatory bodies will likewise become adequate; the pat-
tern of regulation by the stock exchanges is already sufficient.
While adoption of the pertinent provisions of the Uniform
Securities Act is recommended, it appears unlikely that many states
will provide this further assurance of financial responsibility in the
near future. However, any concern over the lack of sufficient assur-
ances by the states is mitigated by the extensive regulation by
federal and self-regulatory bodies.
BARRY A. OsmuN
Conflicts-Most Significant Relationship Rule
Decedent, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, purchased a ticket
in Pennsylvania from an air line, a Delaware corporation with
principal offices in Illinois, for a flight from Pennsylvania to Ari-
zona. The plane crashed while landing at a scheduled stop in
Colorado, causing the decedent's immediate death. The executor
of his estate brought an action against the air line in Pennsylvania
for breach of contract of carriage, seeking recovery under Pennsyl-
vania's law of damages which allowed recovery for decedent's
probable earnings during the period of his life expectancy.1 The
lower court sustained the contract action, but denied recovery
under Pennsylvania's law of damages, holding that the law of the
Special Study, pt. 1, at 85.
1 N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1964, p. 59, col. 5.
'See, e.g., Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 335, 191 A.2d
822, 828-29 (1963).
